Seth Finkelstein posts some clever thought about how terrorists might flummox up the "no-fly" lists (Data corruption attack on terrorist no-fly list?):

The idea is simple: Take a low-level operative, perhaps one who has outlived his usefulness. Send him on a mission that is likely to get him captured. The key idea isn't the mission himself. Rather, have him carry phony "valuable intelligence" documents, with faked ID's in various alias, to get those names added to the no-fly list.

As amusing as that thought is, however, the real question is why would terrorists want to do this? Why would they want to flummox up a mostly ineffectual system that give the illusion, but not the reality of security? Sure, it might increase the costs of the system, but would it be worth it?

I do agree with Finkelstein on his final point though:

While this is of course a very old idea in general, the potential usage of the no-fly list, by terrorists, for creative disruption, has probably been under-examined.